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THE IDENTITY QUESTION,
MADELEINE ALBRIGHT'S PAST, AND ME:
INSIGHTS FROM JEWISH AND
AFRICAN AMERICAN LAW AND LITERATURE
Peter Margulies*
I. INTRODUCTION
My grandfather Severin on my father's side was always very kind to
me. I remember when I was five or six years old, my father would drive us
down from our apartment in the Bronx to meet grandfather on the Upper
West Side of Manhattan. We used to meet in a large cafeteria on
Broadway and Ninety-Sixth Street, which served jello, pie, and soup to a
steadily aging clientele (I believe a Gap store now occupies this space). He
would always have a toy for me, like a large plastic race car. I remember
my grandfather in a suit and tie, even though he was retired and over
seventy years old.
My parents always emphasized to me that I was Jewish, and told me
from an early age that my father and his parents had fled from Vienna,
Austria to Shanghai, China,' at the time of World War II. I knew my
mother had spent the war in the less exotic and more dangerous land of her
birth, Poland, where she, my uncle, and my maternal grandparents were
among the one-thirtieth of the Jewish population that, through a
combination of luck and resourcefulness, survived. When I was slightly
older, my grandfather became infirm. He went to a nursing home, and died
shortly thereafter. My father sat silently in a chair in our living room for
hours when he heard the news.
* Associate Professor, Director, Immigration Clinic, St. Thomas University School of Law,
B.A. 1978, Colgate; J.D. 1981, Columbia. I thank my parents, Josef and Lola Margulies, who
have taught me most of what I know of justice, memory, and compassion. I also thank Beverly
Horsburgh, Dan Morrissey, Ellen Saideman, and Omar Saleem for their comments.
1. 1 never met my paternal grandmother, who died in Shanghai during World War II of heart
failure or hunger, or a mixture of both.
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It was not until much later, before the birth of my first child, Sarah,
that I learned conclusively that my grandfather's given name was not
Severin Margulies, but David Solomon Margulies. Before the war, my
grandfather had been the managing director of a major construction
company in Vienna. The price of his success, however, was a name
change, so that he would not make prospective business associates
uncomfortable with evidence of his Jewish background. My grandfather
never converted to Christianity, or changed his last name, which is Jewish,
but has been mistaken for Greek and Italian. My father never concealed
from me my grandfather's given name, or told me anything but the truth
when asked. For many years, though, I had a vague feeling that there were
easier subjects to discuss within my family.
My grandfather's memory inspires a series of reflections about family
and identity, occasioned by revelations that Madeleine Albright, the new
Secretary of State and the first woman to hold that position, is of Jewish
ancestry, and that Secretary Albright's grandparents died in the Holocaust.
There are some minor but eerie parallels to my grandfather's story.
Albright's family, the Korbels, were also involved in construction work:
they owned a building materials business in Czechoslovakia before World
War II. Josef Korbel, Madeleine's father, was a diplomat who, like many
Czech Jews, considered himself a Czech patriot, and downplayed his ties to
Judaism.
2
Just after the Nazi invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1939, when
Madeleine was almost two years old, the family fled to London. Around
this time, Josef Korbel converted to Roman Catholicism. Madeleine's first
cousin, who also fled with the family, took care of her in London.
Unfortunately, Madeleine's three surviving grandparents remained in
Czechoslovakia. They, along with many others from the Korbel family,
perished in the concentration camps at Auschwitz, Terezin, and Treblinka.
After the war, the Korbels returned to Czechoslovakia. Madeleine's
parents did not tell her about her grandparents' fate, because, at eight years
old, she was deemed too young. In 1948, when the Communists took
power in Czechoslovakia, the Korbels fled again, this time to the United
2. An analogous view was held by many German Jews, who, like Czech Jews, had the
opportunity to assimilate into mainstream society under certain conditions. My grandfather's
name change reveals some of the terms of this accommodation. However, my grandfather always
retained a private commitment to some form of Jewish community, in contrast to the Korbels.
Hannah Arendt was probably fair, albeit sarcastic, in asserting that an assimilated German Jew
sought to "be a man in the street and a Jew at home." See HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF
TOTALITARIANISM 65 (1973) (citing S.M. DUBNOW, HISTORY OF THE JEWS IN RUSSIA AND
POLAND 228 (1918)).
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States. Madeleine's first cousin apparently had a disagreement with Josef
Korbel, and claims that she was not asked to join the family on this
journey. She remained in Czechoslovakia.
Madeleine completed her education in the United States at Wellesley
College and Columbia University, married a newspaper heir, and converted
from Roman Catholicism to Episcopalianism. Her parents apparently
never told her about her Jewish ancestry, or about her grandparents' fate.
She was only told that her grandparents died during the war.3 Albright
became a diplomat, an academic, and most recently, she was appointed
Secretary of State. Some letters from Czechoslovakia describing her
family's background, including one from her first cousin, apparently never
reached her. She discounted other letters because they differed from her
parents' accounts or because they were from Serbians who were angered at
Albright's forthright stand against genocide in Bosnia or because they
mixed in anti-Semitic slurs and innuendo about her chastity with
allegations about her background.
4
Albright initially termed the revelations about her family history as
"obviously a major surprise, '5 but subsequently conceded that she had an
inkling for some time about her Jewish ancestry. She insisted, however,
that she had not known that many of her relatives died in the Nazi death
camps, although she again conceded that indications had been present: "I
feel stupid and deeply regretful at not having seen things that are obvious,
and I'm going to do my damnedest to make it up. . . . Had I not been
immersed in the work I was doing, I would probably have put this two and
two together."
6
A large part of what Madeleine Albright knew about her background
resides in the tangled history of families. I am concerned here with two
kinds of families that intersect in Albright's story. The first is the group we
traditionally tend to view as family-the group of immediate and extended
relatives which I will call "close" family. While we tend to think of close
family as a site for sharinf, there is also often silence. Families frequently
stifle trauma with denial. This phenomenon accounts for at least part of
Albright's parents' reluctance to offer any information about her past.
8
3. Indeed, a memoir by Albright's mother written after Josef Korbel's death in 1977 fails to
mention these facts.
4. Frank Rich, Albright Comes Home, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 1997, at A15 (noting that
Michael Dobbs of the Washington Post first reported the story of Secretary Albright's family
heritage).
5. Frank Rich, The Albright Question, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 1997, at A19.
6. Rich, supra note 4, at A15.
7. See Cynthia Grant Bowman & Elizabeth Mertz, A Dangerous Direction: Legal
1997)
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Albright's story also suggests the existence of another kind of family
which is based on larger claims of identity, including race, gender,
ethnicity, religion, politics, sexual orientation, and combinations of the
above. I call this kind of family the "figurative" family, because its
members consciously or unconsciously use the close family as a metaphor
for the "warmth of intimacy"9 which they practice as an element of
identification with those from the same or overlapping groups.10 The
shared experience of oppression buttresses these affective ties, as the
history of both Jews"' and African Americans demonstrates.'
2
People-both Jews and others' 3who have been talking about
Albright's story since it came to light, view it as a story about close and
figurative family. One element of this discussion centers on Albright's loss
in failing to learn more about from where and whom she came, and about
her lack of communication with her first cousin, who was her caretaker in
London during World War II and learned immediately after the war about
the Korbel family's decimation by the Nazis. However, Albright's close
family also represents the whole texture of the Jewish experience in the
diaspora and the Holocaust. The family matters at issue here are not just
personal questions of belief and association, but intensely public issues of
Intervention in Sexual Abuse Survivor Therapy, 109 HARV. L. REV. 549 (1996); cf Martha
Minow, Surviving Victim Talk, 40 UCLA L. REV. 1411, 1423-26 (1993) (discussing family
violence).
8. My father's willingness to wait until my wife and I were about to have a child to discuss
the details of my grandfather's story, while very different from the rigorous silence of Josef
Korbel, may stem from similar roots. Other friends and acquaintances have told me similar
stories. For example, an acquaintance whose father was a survivor of the death camps said he
never talked about his experience. A friend and fellow law teacher told me that she learned of
her father's flight from Germany to Canada in 1939 from other family members; her father never
spoke about it, either.
9. HANNAH ARENDT. MEN IN DARK TIMES 30 (Harvest Book ed. 1968).
10. Some religions, including Christianity, speak in more universal terms of all of humanity
as a family before God. See Daniel Boyarin & Jonathan Boyarin, Diaspora: Generation and the
Ground of Jewish Identity, 19 CRIT. INQUIRY 693, 694-97 (1993). For a vision of Catholicism as
promoting justice, see Daniel J. Morrissey, A Catholic Moment in Legal Education?, AMERICA,
Oct. 29, 1994, at 4. To the extent that such conceptions do not exclude more particular claims of
figurative family, they are not inconsistent with the model outlined here. In practice, such
universal conceptions have often been viewed as a warrant for exterminating particularity of
various kinds. See RICHARD DELGADO, THE COMING RACE WAR? AND OTHER APOCALYPTIC
TALES OF AMERICA AFTER AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND WELFARE 130, 143 (1996).
11. ARENDT, supra note 9.
12. See Anthony Appiah, The Uncompleted Argument. DuBois and the Illusion of Race, in
"'RACE," WRITING, AND DIFFERENCE 21, 23 (Henry Louis Gates ed., 1985) (citing W.E.B.
DuBois); Dorothy Roberts, The Genetic Tie, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 209, 232-33 (1995).
13. See Barry Saunders, Acknowledging Ethnicity-Until the Taxicabs Pass By, RALEIGH
NEWS & OBSERVER, Mar. 1, 1997, at AI9, available in 1997 WL 7824917 (providing African
American perspective on Albright).
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collective memory. Indeed, Albright's story reveals, if any further proof
were needed, the artificiality of the dichotomy between the personal and
the political. The press has examined Albright's story, but so too have
millions of families, who have talked in living rooms and on telephones
about their own memories and the Secretary of State's, as if Albright was
for each family a kind of prodigal.'
4
The exploration of collective memory spurred by Albright's story is a
crucial virtue of figurative families. At the same time, there is something
potentially oppressive about the presumption shared by millions, myself
included, that Albright's past, sixty years in the making, is a ripe text for
our own reminiscences. This essay addresses both the emancipatory and
oppressive dimensions of figurative family, often in tandem with close
family. Because experiences of subordination are central in developing a
sense of figurative family, the discussion centers on the literature and legal
theory of two groups which have known subordination, albeit in different
ways-Jewish and African Americans. 15 I focus on three stances toward
identity-shame, acknowledgment, and engagement.'
6
II. IDENTITY STANCES
Some further elaboration about how this essay uses the terms shame,
acknowledgment, and engagement may assist the reader.
14. 1 have talked to my parents because of Albright's story, and learned more about my
grandfather's life in Vienna. For example, as I wrote this essay, I learned from my father, who is
proud of the great achievements of German culture, such as Mozart, Beethoven, and Goethe, that
my grandfather was born in Poland. Cf Joan Behrmann, What Could Be More Tragic Than the
Loss of Family Heritage?, DETROIT NEWS, Mar. 6, 1997, at D7, available in 1997 WL 5580291
(remembering her grandfather).
15. Analogies between different systems of oppression can perpetuate subordination, instead
of combating it. See Tina Grillo & Stephanie Wildman, Obscuring the Importance of Race: The
Implication of Making Comparisons Between Racism and Sexism (Or Other -Isms), 1991 DuKE
L.J. 397. 1 seek to demonstrate in this essay that acknowledging differences in the Jewish and
African American experience, including the central role of a tacit, semi-conscious White
supremacy in American life, can also shed light on the construction of identity.
16. This essay is an exploratory piece whose conclusions are necessarily provisional. The
reader should also be aware that to capture the intensity of debates about identity, the essay
includes some quotes from Jewish and African American writers which contain racial and ethnic
slurs referring to the writer's own group. Writers like Philip Roth and Ralph Ellison used these
words to enact the themes of acknowledgment, engagement, and shame discussed in this article.
Omitting such expressions would re-enact the dynamic of shame criticized in this essay, and
silence writers who should speak for themselves.
19971
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A. Shame
Consider shame first. Shame stems from concern about the perceived
reactions of the dominant culture. For example, Jewish people who caution
that someone's behavior or appearance is "too Jewish" reflect this stance.
Shame can also result from revealing to the dominant culture practices,
traits, or attitudes which in some fashion are perceived to reinforce
negative stereotypes.
The social, political, and economic situations of members of a group
determines in large part how members of the group respond to shame. One
response is assimilation-trying to become more like members of the
dominant culture and discounting the value of practices, attitudes, and
traditions from the figurative family. A second response is exit-
"converting" to the dominant culture, as when Jews convert to Christianity.
A third response is deception-concealing one's ties to both close and
figurative family. Madeleine Albright's father sought to conceal his
family's history as do some African Americans who seek to "pass" for
White.
B. Acknowledgment
The opposite of shame is acknowledgment. Acknowledgment
involves the public recognition of ties to both close and figurative families
from a particular group, such as Jewish people. Acknowledgment has a
variation, which I term "virtual" acknowledgment. In virtual acknowledg-
ment, one does not explicitly disclose close or figurative familial ties, but
acts in the dominant culture in a manner consistent with those ties.
Madeleine Albright's placing of the Holocaust and human rights near the
center of her foreign policy perspective, because it is consistent with her
heritage as a descendant of a historically subordinated people, could be
viewed as a kind of virtual acknowledgment.
17
C. Engagement
A third stance is engagement. Engagement builds on
acknowledgment. A writer who practices engagement both acknowledges
her links with figurative family, and incorporates that acknowledgment into
an effort to change her figurative family, or the larger society. Of all the
17. To acknowledge one's ties, of course, one has to know about them. My characterization
of Albright's views assumes, as she has acknowledged, that she had some inkling of her ancestry
well before public revelation of it occurred.
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stances described here, engagement is the most risky. This is particularly
true when engagement addresses issues which have also engendered shame.
In these situations, engagement can yield change, but can also provoke the
opprobrium visited upon all those who "betray" their-family by airing dirty
linen.
III. IDENTITY STANCES AND JEWISH AMERICAN LITERATURE
The conflict between shame and acknowledgment of identity has been
the central preoccupation of modern Jewish-American literature. Authors,
critics, and fictional characters frequently have experienced shame when
confronting Anglo-American culture's images of the Jewish experience.
For some, the response has been assimilation or deception, although
outright exit has been less common as a phenomenon in literature than in
life. These stances, here as elsewhere, have been played out in the arenas
of close and figurative family.
Modern Jewish-American fiction acknowledges familial ties through
both language and plot. The mixture of vernacular speech, compulsive
self-revelation, and stubborn, and sometimes irritating, honesty in most
protagonists of Jewish-American fiction bespeaks a set of allegiances
distinct from earlier American writers. This hybrid style, a product of
immigrant culture, does not hide its difference from the decorous
maneuvering of Henry James, or the clipped matter-of-factness of
Hemingway. Speaking of typical Anglo-American attitudes, the narrator of
Saul Bellow's first novel, Dangling Man, notes, "If you have difficulties,
grapple with them silently, goes one of their commandments. To hell with
that! I intend to talk about mine."
' 18
Ironically, sometimes this candor raises hackles in the storyteller's
close and figurative families who wish to assimilate in peace. For example,
in Philip Roth's comic novel, The Ghost Writer, the protagonist Nathan
Zuckerman writes a short story about his family, which-with a cruel
humor born of both years of observation and the resentment which
adolescents sometimes bear their parents-portrays Jewish-Americans,
warts and all, as materialistic, focused on status and appearances and, at
least among males, preternaturally fascinated with women "not of our
persuasion."' 9  Shocked by this betrayal, Nathan's father asks a family
benefactor, Judge Leopold Wapter, to write Nathan to remonstrate with
18. See SAUL BELLOW, DANGLING MAN 9 (Meridian ed. 1960), cited in JOHN MURRAY
CUDDIHY, THE ORDEAL OF CIVILITY: FREUD, MARX, LEVI-STRAUSS, AND THE JEWISH
STRUGGLE WITH MODERNITY 218 (1987).
19. PHILIP ROTH, THE GHOST WRITER 82 (1979).
1997]
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him. Judge Wapter concludes his letter with ten questions for Nathan,
presumably modeled after both the Ten Commandments and the Four
Questions which the youngest child in the family recites at Passover
regarding the commemoration of the Jews' flight from slavery in Egypt.
Judge Wapter's questions include the following:
5. In a story with a Jewish background, what reason is there
for a description of physical intimacy between a married Jewish
man and an unmarried Christian woman? Why in a story with a
Jewish background must there be (a) adultery; (b) incessant
fighting within a family over money; (c) warped human
behavior in general?
10. Can you honestly say that there is anything in your short
story that would not warm the heart of [Nazi war criminals]
Julius Streicher or ... Joseph Goebbels?
20
When Nathan tells his mother he is upset by the judge's grouping him
with Nazi war criminals, she interjects, "He only meant that what
happened to the Jews..."
Nathan interrupts with sarcasm:
[Y]ou want to see physical violence done to the Jews of [New
Jersey], go the office of the plastic surgeon where the girls get
their noses fixed. That's where the Jewish blood flows in Essex
County, that's where the blow is delivered-with a mallet! To
their bones-and to their pride!
22
Nathan Zuckerman's acknowledgment of his Jewishness is more
acknowledgment than his family needs. Because his family recognizes
itself, albeit in distorted form, in his story, Zuckerman provokes not pride
but shame-the proverbial shanda for the goyim, or shame before the
dominant gentile culture.23
20. Id. at 103-04.
21. Id. at 106 (Nathan states, "The Big Three, Mama! Streicher, Goebbels, and your son!").
Roth's account here clearly stems from the furor created by his earlier books, particularly
Portnoy's Complaint, the novel to end all novels about Jewish mothers and Jewish males'
worship of White Gentile women shikses. PHILIP ROTH, PORTNOY'S COMPLAINT (1969).
22. Id.
23. As Roth puts it,
The goyim, who looked down on us with enough unearned contempt already ...
would be only too pleased to call us all kikes because of what I had written for the
whole world to read about Jews fighting over money. It was not for me to leak the
news that such a thing could possibly happen. That was worse than informing-
that was collaborating.
Id. at 110.
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The family's shame at this public airing of dirty linen echoes the
embarrassment of the assimilated German Jews and Jews from
Czechoslovakia, like Madeleine Albright's parents, at the Jews from
Eastern Europe-the Ost'uden. The German Jews, like my grandfather
Severin, who felt a kinship to German culture as well as to Judaism, viewed
the Ostjuden as uncouth and unlettered.24  The fact that family ties
frequently stretched across the two groups is something the German Jews
usually endeavored to conceal as much as possible.
25
Ironically, popular interpretations of the Holocaust seem to echo the
German Jews' refusal to acknowledge the Ostjuden. In The Ghost Writer,
Judge Wapter urges Zuckerman to read The Diary of Anne Frank, to better
understand the lessons of the Holocaust for Jews. Yet, The Diary of Anne
Frank, which is the story of a Jewish girl in Holland who ultimately is
killed by the Nazis, offers a portrait of Jewish life notable for its lack of
particularity. As Roth notes, Anne Frank touched the world when she
wrote, "The time will come when we are people again, and not just
Jews."'2 6 It is the disjunction of "Jews" from "people"-as if Jewishness
was solely a negative image imposed from without, as opposed to a set of
commitments for people to live by-that disturbs Roth. Yet, as Roth
argues, this erasure of particularity may have been for the best. A more
fervent insistence of particularity on Anne Frank's part might have made it
seem like she deserved her fate for not "getting with the program."
27
In this sense, one can view images of the Holocaust as themselves a
manifestation of shame and a sign of assimilation. Another manifestation
of shame is deception-the concealment of close family ties, sometimes to
children within the family itself. This seems to be the path taken by
24. The most compelling discussion of the relationship between German Jews and Ostjuden
is in HANNAH ARENDT, Walter Benjamin, 1892-1940, in MEN IN DARK TIMES 153, 186 (Harvest
Book ed. 1968).
25. My father, who was born in Vienna, is a cousin of my maternal grandmother, who spent
World War If hiding from the Nazis in Poland until she and the surviving members of my
mother's family were liberated by the Russians. My father still jokingly refers to my mother as a
"Galiziano," a derisive term for Jews who grew up in my mother's part of Poland: Galicia. I
have known about this family tie for many years. However, as noted above, it was only in the
course of writing this essay that I learned from my father that his father, the successful Viennese
construction executive, was also born in Poland.
26. ROTH, supra note 19, at 142.
27. To expect the great callous and indifferent world to care about the child of a
pious, bearded father living under the sway of the rabbis and rituals-that was pure
folly. To the ordinary person with no great gift for tolerating even the smallest of
differences the plight of that family wouldn't mean a thing. To ordinary people it
probably would seem that they had invited disaster by repudiating everything
modem and European-not to say Christian.
Id. at 144.
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Madeleine Albright's parents who never, for whatever reason, found the
right time to tell Albright about her grandparents' life and death. A work
of fiction which addresses issues of deception outside of the close family is
Bernard Malamud's story, The Lady of the Lake.
29
In Malamud's story, Henry Levin, an American Jew, travels to
Europe. His ties to close family have evaporated with the deaths of his
parents. The dissolution of these ties coincides with Levin's willingness
to undo his ties to the figurative family of Jewry. Levin is apparently "tired
of the past-tired of the limitations it had imposed upon him."30  To
connote his new-found lack of constraints, Levin changes his name to
"Freeman"--free man. Freeman meets a beautiful Italian woman, Isabella,
who soon asks him, out of the blue, if he is Jewish. Momentarily shocked,
but secure in the knowledge that he does not "look Jewish," he replies in
the negative. He and Isabella fall in love. However, Freeman's deception
turns to disaster when, after proposing marriage, Isabella reveals that she
has asked about his origins because she is Jewish. "I can't marry you," she
responds, "we are Jews. My past is meaningful to me. I treasure what I
suffered for." 31 Before Freeman can explain, Isabella disappears. Having
jettisoned his own past, Freeman is left with no future.
IV. JEWISH AMERICAN LEGAL THEORISTS,
LAWYERS, AND ASSIMILATION
Acknowledgment of Jewish identity is still finding its place in
American legal theory. The history of legal theory and practice by Jewish-
Americans, while reflecting profound contributions to the profession and
the public good, reveals many foregone opportunities for acknowledgment
of the figurative family of Jews. While failures of acknowledgment by
Jewish-American legal theorists usually do not encompass the deception
employed by Freeman in Malamud's story, they are nonetheless significant.
However, there is also an emerging history of acknowledgment and
engagement which requires recognition. I discuss the failures and
equivocations of acknowledgment first.
28. Bernard Malamud, The Lady of the Lake, in THE MAGIC BARREL 105 (1958).
29. Id. at 126.
30. Id. at 105.
31. Id. at 132.
THE IDENTITY QUESTION
A. Universalism and Jewish Legal Identity
Usually the failures of acknowledgment involve a commitment to
some form of universalism. One can discern the influence of this
universalism in both the neutral principles of the legal process school
which flourished in post-war American academia, and the radical
egalitarianism of Marxist theory. The failure of acknowledgment tends to
be more decisive with the legal process school. In contrast, radical
egalitarians, like the members of the Critical Legal Studies movement,
sometimes offer a kind of back-handed acknowledgment which suggests
that their Jewish identity may be more important to them than they would
have their readers believe.
Let us consider first the dynamics of identity in the legal process
school. Herbert Wechsler, the greatest exponent of the "neutral principles"
view of law, which exalted the legal process over substantive values,
warned against acknowledging figurative family in any aspect of the legal
32system. Wechsler expressed this view in his criticism of the State of
Israel's abduction, trial, and execution of Adolf Eichmann, the official in
charge of the Nazi death camps, for "crimes against the Jewish people."
33
Wechsler argued that assessing the Holocaust in universal terms, as "a war
crime and a crime against humanity as well as a crime against the law of
32. In situating Wechsler as a member of the legal process school, I recognize that Wechsler
nonetheless had substantial differences with other members of the school, such as Alexander
Bickel. The difference between Wechsler and Bickel centered on whether courts could depart
from Wechsler's "neutral principles" to act in accordance not with principle, but with prudence.
See Edward L. Rubin, The New Legal Process, the Synthesis of Discourse, and the Microanalysis
of Institutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1393, 1398 (1996); cf Anthony T. Kronman, Alexander
Bickel's Philosophy of Prudence, 94 YALE L.J. 1567 (1985) (discussing Bickel's approach).
33. Israeli intelligence agents seized Eichmann in Argentina, where principles of
international law granted them no authority. One's view of the sanctity of those principles in
Eichmann's case may be influenced by knowledge that Argentina in effect held itself out as a
haven for Nazis fleeing prosecution for war crimes. In her famous account of the trial, Hannah
Arendt acknowledged Argentina's role as a haven, while still finding Israel's action illegitimate.
HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE BANALITY OF EVIL 264
(Viking Compass Books ed. 1965). My discussion of Wechsler's views is drawn from Pnina
Lahav's thoughtful article. See Pnina Lahav, The Eichmann Trial, the Jewish Question, and the
American-Jewish Intelligentsia, 72 B.U. L. REV. 555 (1992). Wechsler reiterated his view that
the Eichmann trial was illegal in Norman Silber & Geoffrey Miller, Toward "Neutral Principles"
in the Law: Selections from the Oral History of Herbert Wechsler, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 854, 916
(1993). For a critique of the earlier war crimes trials conducted at Nuremberg by the victorious
Allied Powers, see DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL MODERNISM 335 (1994). Wechsler always defended
the legality of the Nuremberg Tribunal, for which he was a key advisor. See Silber & Miller,
supra, at 891-917.
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the states where the offense was perpetrated," was the most fitting
approach.
34
For Wechsler, who did not mention his own Jewish background, the
identity of the Nazis' targets was almost incidental: the Holocaust's
"victims were Jewish people." 35  In contrast to the Israeli legislation,
Wechsler omitted the article 'the' before his mention of "Jewish people."
The Israeli legislation acknowledged the ties of figurative family, while
Wechsler's omission had the effect of grudgingly conceding the existence
of some superficial common trait, as in "tall and skinny people."
Wechsler's characterization discounted two important facts. First, Jewish
achievements, from the recording of the Old Testament to the development
of Yiddish to the distinctive voices of writers like Malamud, Bellow, and
Roth, stem largely from people who acknowledged strong, not superficial,
ties to some conception of Jewish identity.36 Second, while the Nazis also
believed in a strong conception of Jewish identity, the answer to the Nazis
should be not to weaken those family ties, but to acknowledge their worth.
Wechsler's refusal to acknowledge figurative family ties was not
without moral justification. Wechsler clearly believed that neutral
principles are a check on the excesses of particularity, including not only
Israel's abduction of Eichmann, but also abuses committed by Israel
against Palestinian Arabs. 37 In refusing to acknowledge figurative family
ties, Wechsler avoided the oppression of others which can emerge from the
family paradigm. He did so, however, only at the price of bleaching out
key facts about the subordination of Jewish people, and assimilating them
into "people... not just Jews, ' 38 just like Roth's Anne Frank.
Another trend in Jewish legal theory which echoes the universalism of
legal process theory is Marxism. At first blush, Marxism, with its disdain
for neutrality and rights, seems like the antithesis of the legal process
school. Upon closer examination, however, Marxism is close to legal
process jurisprudence in its erasure of ethnic, racial, gender, and religious
34. See Lahav, supra note 33, at 565 (citing Herbert Wechsler, The Nation's Future (NBC
radio debate, Apr. 8, 1961)).
35. Id.
36. The question of whether that identity can be secular and humanist, or should involve
some kind of religious observance is beyond the scope of this essay. The dominant voices in
American legal culture, including progressive lawyers, discouraged assertion of Jewish ideality
earlier in this century. See JEROLD S. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUSTICE 186 (1976) (quoting
Thurman Arnold as recommending a promising young lawyer as being deviod of "Jewish
characteristics").
37. See Lahav, supra note 33, at 564.
38. ROTH, supra note 19, at 142.
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identity.39 Orthodox Marxism stresses a materialist analysis, focusing on
the ownership and control of the means of production, which treats class as
central. Other sources of identity are at best distractions, and at worst,
occasions for class disunity that capitalists can exploit. Yet, even
intellectuals with a Marxist bent have expressed their Jewish roots in
varying ways.
One avenue of this expression is the Messianic element of Marxism.
Karl Marx envisioned an end to history, entailing the withering away of the
state and the emergence of a classless society. Of course, this vision also
owes a great deal to Georg Friedrich Hegel. In addition, Marx believed
that one could not wait for the Messiah; instead, people had to act and
organize. Marx, however, sought to inspire these actions through his
prophecy against an oppressive system of class exploitation,4 ' with a vigor
that recalled the jeremiads of the Old Testament prophets.
Some contemporary legal scholars influenced by Marxist thought
have acknowledged their identity in other oblique ways. Mark Tushnet is a
good example. Tushnet made his name as a Critical Legal Studies scholar
applying a Marxist analysis of law. His disdain for rights is a particular
feature of this approach. Tushnet recently critiqued the work of Critical
Race scholars, who insist on other elements of identity besides class, and
the work of post-modem scholars, which he regards as lacking normative
content. Gary Peller, in a bitter exchange with Tushnet on the first point,
has linked Tushnet's wariness of the more personal style and assertion of
racial identit by Critical Race scholars with a Jewish drive toward
assimilation.
A closer look at Tushnet's work complicates Peller's analysis of
Tushnet's Jewish identity. Tushnet's assertion of his Jewish identity is
ambivalent, erratic, and anecdotal, yet it is still present. Consider in this
regard Tushnet's retelling of an incident from his childhood as a "red
diaper baby," a child whose parents were at one time active Communists.
Tushnet recounts how his mother, asked in a deposition about whether she
knew Communists were meeting in her living room, responded with a
39. See Boyarin & Boyarin, supra note 10, at 708.
40. This is a key element in the Critical Race Theory critique of Critical Legal Studies. See
Kimberld Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimization in
Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1331, 1356-69 (1988); Harlon Dalton, The Clouded
Prism, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 35 (1987); Richard Delgado, The Ethereal Scholar: Does
Critical Legal Studies Have What Minorities Want?, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 301 (1987).
41. See Isaiah Berlin, Benjamin Disraeli and Karl Marx, in AGAINST THE CURRENT:
ESSAYS IN THE HISTORY OF IDEAS 252, 283 (Penguin Books ed. 1982).
42. Gary Peller, The Discourse of Constitutional Degradation, 81 GEO. L.J. 313 (1992).
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comprehensive inventory of the living room furniture. Her eye-glazing
account, replete with evocations of "the piano in the corner, with an
accordion underneath, '4 3 stalled the legal process in a mire of domestic
detail. In telling this story, Tushnet evokes the irony which Jews and other
subordinated people have always used to confound their pursuers.
44
Both the legal process and Marxian commentators miss crucial
opportunities through their, at best, oblique acknowledgment of Jewish
roots. Both schools of thought perpetuate the view that acknowledgment is
bad form, and assimilation the pathway to the common good-the fabled
"melting pot" of American culture. However, the melting pot metaphor
neglects the crucial question: Who throws whom into the pot?
Neglecting this question has consequences for law and legal theory.
In the legal process school's refusal to acknowledge difference, one can see
the roots of neo-conservative opposition to affirmative action. Opposition
develops because any recognition of the need for different treatment creates
tensions with the assimilation ideal and with unitary conceptions of
"merit." 45
Similarly, reticence about acknowledging identity has led to criticism,
in the name of universal norms like "legal scholarship" or "narrative
integrity" of Critical Race theorists, who expressly incorporate identity into
their work.46 The problem, of course, is that treating "legal scholarship" as
43. Mark Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies: A Political History, 100 YALE L.J. 1515, 1535-
36(1991).
44. See DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM OF THE WELL 175-76 (1992).
45. Bickel states most clearly his view that affirmative action is a dangerous deployment of
acknowledgment of difference: "A quota is a divider of society, a creator of castes... especially
in a society desperately striving for an equality that will make race irrelevant." ALEXANDER M.
BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 133 (1975). Yet Bickel also recognized, as this essay
contends, that criteria for university admissions, employment, and other goods are "class-bound
and framed in terms of the culture of a dominant group." Id. at 132. This move allowed Bickel
to view some criteria as discriminatory, and thus suspect under a legal process paradigm, while
affirming the baneful influence of group identity. Bickel drew the line at acknowledging the
value of group identity under law. For an explicitly different view acknowledging this value, see
Gary Peller, Race Consciousness, 1990 DUKE L.J. 758; cf Susan Sturm & Lani Guinier, The
Future of Affirmative Action: Reclaiming the Innovative Ideal, 84 CAL. L. REV. 953 (1996)
(refraining in more inclusive fashion criteria for access to employment and other social goods).
46. See Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Legal Storytelling and Constitutional Law, in
LAW'S STORIES 37 (Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996); Richard Posner, Nuance,
Narrative, and Empathy in Critical Race Theory, in OVERCOMING LAW 368-84 (1995); Daniel
A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Is the Radical Critique of Merit Anti-Semitic?, 83 CAL. L. REV. 853
(1995); Daniel Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School: An Essay on Legal
Narratives, 45 STAN. L. REV. 807 (1993); Suzanna Sherry, The Sleep of Reason, 84 GEO. L.J.
453 (1996); Mark Tushnet, The Degradation of Constitutional Discourse, 81 GEO. L.J. 251
(1992). 1 discuss these critiques in two upcoming pieces: Peter Margulies, Doubting Doubleness,
and All That Jazz: Establishment Critiques of Outsider Innovations in Music and Legal Theory,
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a self-evident and objective concept enshrines ja particular kind of legal
scholarship, while excluding others. Acknowledging particularity at least
allows for a discussion of both difference and common ground, instead of a
unilateral exclusion which effectively ends conversation.
B. Engagement and Jewish Identity
Acknowledgment also paves the way for engagement. As noted
above, I use the term engagement to connote those writers who have shared
the transformative ideals of Tushnet and other radical commentators, but
who have also more expressly incorporated some conception of figurative
family into their work. Yet acknowledgment and transformative rhetoric
can be a dangerous mix, particularly when one targets one's own figurative
family for transformation. Often the family, as with the Nathan
Zuckerman's family in Roth's The Ghost Writer, can view the engaged
writer as acknowledging too much, and doing so in the wrong place.
Sometimes the engaged writer, like Roth with his sarcasm, can even
contribute to this impression.
Hannah Arendt's writing about the Eichmann trial and Israeli
sovereignty reveals both the promise and the peril of engagement. Arendt
was not a lawyer, even though her writings on these two subjects have legal
implications. She studied philosophy with Martin Heidigger,4 7 but was
arrested in 1933 by the Nazis for smuggling Communists out of the
country. Arendt became a refugee relief worker in Paris after fleeing Nazi
Germany upon her release. Returning to Germany for a talk after the war,
she acknowledged her identity explicitly: "[F]or many years I considered
the only adequate reply to the question, Who are You? to be: A Jew. That
,,48
answer alone took into account the reality of persecution. Arendt, in her
51 U. MIAMI L. REV. -_ (forthcoming 1997); Peter Margulies, Inclusive and Exclusive Virtues:
Identity. Responsibility, and Merit in Recent Legal Thought, 46 CATH. U. L. REV. __
(forthcoming 1997).
47. Some years after World War II, Arendt tried to rehabilitate Heidigger, who had joined
the Nazi Party in the 1930s. Arendt also had a romantic relationship with Heidigger before the
war. See ELZBIETA ETTINGER, HANNAH ARENDT/MARTIN HEIDEGGER (1995). Yet Arendt
acknowledged to collegues Heidegger's bad behavior. See HANNAH ARENDT & KARL JASPERS,
CORRESPONDENCE 1926-69, at 47-48 (Lotte Kohler & Hans Saner eds., & Rita Kimer trans., Ist
ed. 1992) (describing Heidigger as a "potential murderer" for his role in the prosecution of his
teacher and collegue, Edmund Husserl). Focusing solely on Arendt's emotional attachment to
Heidigger risks trivializing her views on political theory. See Anne M. Lane, Hannah Arendt:
Theorist of Distinction(s), 25 POL. THEORY 137, 140 (1997). Scholars since Arendt have found
Heidigger to be an important source of insight; see, e.g., Edward Rubin, On Beyond Truth: A
Theory for Evaluating Legal Scholarship, 80 CAL. L. REV. 899 (1992) (invoking Heidegger to
formulate criteria for legal scholarship).
48. ARENDT, supra note 9, at 17.
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reporting on the Eichmann trial, also acknowledged the importance of the
proceeding for Jewish identity: "[F]or the first time (since the year 70,
when Jerusalem was destroyed by the Romans), Jews were able to sit in
judgment on crimes committed against their own people ... for the first
time, they did not need to appeal to others for protection and justice ....
Yet, Arendt still had profound reservations about the Eichmann trial.
Her first reservation stemmed from the same previously discussed concerns
about international law. Her second objection was that the trial, in its
"official version," contributed not to an understanding of the Holocaust but
to its mystification, in a way analogous to Philip Roth's concern about the
canonization of Anne Frank. While Roth rejected the portrayal of Anne
Frank, the cultural icon, as a saint shorn of particularity, Arendt saw the
success of this portrayal as "reducing horror to sentimentality.'"50 Similarly,
Arendt viewed the Eichmann trial as a demonization of a bureaucrat, who
was culpable precisely because he obediently managed an efficient state
apparatus that killed over six million people. While the prosecution at the
trial painted Eichmann as a murderous mastermind, it was Eichmann's
obedience and calm efficiency that most terrified Arendt. As she observed,
Eichmann represented not the singularity, but the "banality of evil."
51
Arendt noted that "[t]he trouble with Eichmann was precisely that so many
were like him, and that the many were neither perverted nor sadistic, that
they were, and still are, terribly and terrifyingly normal."
52
For Arendt, demonizing Eichmann and sentimentalizing Anne Frank
created a dangerous myth for the world and the Jewish figurative family.
One consequence of this myth was the demonization of others, like the
Arab inhabitants of Palestine.53 Arendt argued that Jews were not immune
from experiencing Eichmann's condition, in which demonization of others
makes brutality into business as usual.
54
When one realizes that Arendt could stake out this position, but also
tell her friend, the novelist and critic Mary McCarthy, that "[a]ny real
49. ARENDT, supra note 33, at 271.
50. ARENDT, supra note 9, at 19. Readers who have seen Steven Spielberg's movie,
SCHINDLER'S LIST, may remember the red coat of the young girl who ultimately dies at the hands
of the Nazis-the only spot of color in a sea of stark black and white. As the father of two young
Jewish girls, I can testify to the power of this image, sentimental though it may be.
51. ARENDT, supra note 33, at 252.
52. Id. at 276.
53. Arendt did not expressly make this point in Eichmann in Jerusalem, but it is consistent
with concerns about displacement of Palestinians she had expressed prior to the creation of the
State of Israel, almost 20 years before her report on the Eichmann trial. See ELIZABETH YOUNG-
BRUEHL, HANNAH ARENDT: FOR LOVE OF THE WORLD 223-33 (1982).
54. ARENDT, supra note 33, at 292-93.
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catastrophe in Israel would affect me more than almost anything else,"
55
the full extent of Arendt's engagement becomes clear. Yet, as noted above,
engagement can offend notions of figurative family, particularly when
engagement involves an audience beyond the family's boundaries. Many
Jewish intellectuals and activists criticized Arendt as soulless, distant, and
even anti-Semitic in her views. 56  Contributing to this impression was
Arendt's steadfast refusal to publicly participate in the "warmth of
intimacy"57 which is part of figurative family identity.
58
One of the intellectuals who criticized Arendt's tone of "Olympian
authority" was Ralph Ellison, 59 author of the great novel, Invisible Man.
6
0
Ironically, Ellison's relationship with the diverse figurative family of
African Americans raised some of the same concerns about distance,
acknowledgment, and engagement that shaped Arendt's relationship with
Jewish Americans. The following section addresses these issues in
African American literature and law.
55. YOUNG-BRUEHL, supra note 53, at 455.
56. Id. at 337-55.
57. ARENDT, supra note 9, at 30.
58. A public statement like the reflection about Israel in her letter to Mary McCarthy might
have slaked the public uproar. But Arendt was unwilling, and perhaps unable, to make such a
statement in public.
One important development in legal scholarship in the past 10 to 15 years has been the
emergence of a group of writers who, in contrast to Wechsler's failure of acknowledgment and
Arendt's wariness about public displays of family feeling, have acknowledged their Jewish
identity, and done so in a more personal way than Arendt displayed. Many of these writers were
inspired by the work of the late Robert Cover. See ROBERT BURT, Two JEWISH JUSTICES:
OUTCASTS IN THE PROMISED LAND (1988); ROBERT COVER, NARRATIVE, VIOLENCE, AND THE
LAW: THE ESSAYS OF ROBERT COVER (Martha Minow et al. eds., 1992); Robert Burt,
Constitutional Law and the Teaching of the Parables, 93 YALE L.J. 455 (1984); Howard Lesnick,
The Wellsprings of Legal Responses to Inequality: A Perspective on Perspectives, 1991 DUKE
L.J. 413; Sanford Levinson, Identifying the Jewish Lawyer: Reflections on the Construction of
Professional Identity, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1577 (1993) (discussing how Judaism influences
images of professionalism); Peter Margulies, Difference and Distrust in Asylum Law: Haitian
and Holocaust Refugee Narratives, 6 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 135 (1994); Russell G. Pearce, Jewish
Lawyering in a Multicultural Society: A Midrash on Levinson, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1613
(1993); Suzanne L. Stone, In Pursuit of the Counter-Text: The Turn to the Jewish Legal Model in
Contemporary American Legal Theory, 106 HARV. L. REV. 813 (1993); Steven L. Winter, Legal
Storytelling: The Cognitive Dimension of the Agon Between Legal Power and Narrative
Meaning, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2225 (1989); cf MILNER S. BALL, THE WORD AND THE LAW (1993)
(discussing Cover's thought); Beverly Horsburgh, Jewish Women, Black Women: Guarding
Against the Oppression ofSurrogacy, 8 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 29 (1993); Beverly Horsburgh,
Lifting the Veil of Secrecy: Domestic Violence in the Jewish Community, 18 HARV. WOMEN'S
L.J. 171 (1995).
59. See RALPH ELLISON, SHADOW AND ACT 108 (1972).
60. RALPH ELLISON, INVISIBLE MAN (Vintage Books ed. 1972).
61. Henry Louis Gates, Jr., King of Cats, NEW YORKER, Apr. 8, 1996, at 70, 80 (discussing
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V. IDENTITY STANCES IN AFRICAN AMERICAN FICTION
Ties to the figurative family, as well as close family, have always
been central to African American fiction. Just as the contrast between the
Jew as outsider and Christianity as the norm has been a salient theme in
Jewish American fiction, the relationship between Blacks and Whiteness
has had a prominent place in the literature of African Americans.
Characters struggle with acknowledgment of their figurative families, and
worry about what Whites will think of their relatives. Writers who focus
attention on the family's "dirty linen" are accused of reinforcing racism.
Indeed, racism raises the stakes for African American writers, creating a
sense of urgency that the relatively privileged position of American Jews
has dissipated.
One outgrowth of American racism has been a narrowing of options
for Blacks who wish to shed the racial element of their identity. While
American Jews have had the choice of assimilation, exit, or deception, the
link between racism and readily discernible attributes such as skin color
makes assimilation and exit much more difficult for African Americans.
62
Historically, at least, assimilation and exit were choices for African
Americans only where deception was also possible-i.e., when an African
63American could "pass" for White. African American writers have
explored the kind of acknowledgment that is necessary for a person who
possesses such an option.
In this regard, consider the character Golden Gray from Toni
Morrison's Jazz.64 Gray is the offspring of a romance between a Black
man and the daughter of a Confederate colonel. His color matches his first
name-Golden. His father, for understandable reasons, has left the scene,
and his mother keeps from him this half of his lineage. As a young man,
Gray discovers this secret, which devastates him. He feels incomplete, like
Ellison's distance from younger generation of African American writers).
62. The rigid definition of race employed in the United States-particularly the view that
any trace of Black ancestry made a person Black in the eyes of the law-has inspired resistance
and critical analysis, as well as deception. See IAN HANEY-LOPEZ, WHITE BY LAW (1996);
David Wilkins, Introduction, in K. ANTHONY APPIAH & AMY GUTMANN, COLOR CONSCIOUS 3
(1996); Adrienne Davis. Identity Notes Part One: Playing in the Light, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 695
(1996); Neil Gotanda, A Critique of "Our Constitution is Color-Blind, " 44 STAN. L. REV. I
(1991); D. Marvin Jones. Darkness Made Visible: Law. Metaphor, and the Racial Self 82 GEO.
L.J. 437 (1993).
63. For two recent works of non-fiction written by law teachers whose appearance might
have allowed them to pass, see JUDY SCALES-TRENT, NOTES OF A WHITE BLACK WOMAN:
RACE, COLOR, COMMUNITY (1995); GREGORY H. WILLIAMS, LIFE ON THE COLOR LINE: THE
TRUE STORY OF A WHITE BOY WHO DISCOVERED HE WAS BLACK (1995).
64. TONI MORRISON, JAZZ (1992).
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someone missing an arm. He leaves to search for his father, with the
avowed intention of killing him. When the two meet, his father is blunt: "I
know what you came for. To see how black I was."
65
Gray's father, Hunter, views Gray's mother as many have viewed
Secretary Albright's parents, accusing her of willfully hiding the child's
background from him so that he will be free from the inconvenience of
membership in a subordinated group. 66  In response, Gray offers a
justification analogous to the one provided by many on behalf of Albright's
parents: "She protected me. If she'd announced I was a nigger, I could
have been a slave."67 Hunter replies that an acknowledgment of Blackness
does not ineluctably lead to enslavement; there always have been free
Black people, he asserts. Gray responds in the key of universalism
sounded by Herbert Wechsler in his discussion of the Holocaust: "I don't
want to be a free nigger, I want to be a free man."68 "Don't we all," Hunter
replies. "Be what you want-white or black. Choose." 69 While Gray's
choice is left ambiguous, the reader learns that Gray does not make good
on his intention to kill Hunter, who appears later in the novel.
Morrison's focus is on Gray's virtual acknowledgment of family,
made before he even meets his father. As True Belle, his mother's servant,
tells him as he gets ready for his journey into his past, "It don't matter if
you do find [your father] or not; it's the going that counts. ' 7° Realizing
True Belle's prediction, Gray saves a pregnant Black woman he finds lying
unconscious in a ditch on his way to find his father. The woman turns out
to be the mother of Joe, one of the two main characters in the novel. True
Belle, who helped raise Gray, turns out to be the grandmother of Joe's
future wife, Violet. Thus, but for Gray's decision to be a Good Samaritan
for an unkempt Black woman lying on the side of the road, the plot, as well
as Joe, might have been stillborn.
In telling Gray's story, Morrison seems to be suggesting the
possibility of a kind of virtual acknowledgment. In this kind of
acknowledgment, good works, and not express acknowledgment of family
in and of itself, is the essence of salvation. Judy Scales-Trent says the
same thing in talking about her missing great-uncle Charles, who
apparently disappeared to try his luck at passing in the White world.
65. Id. at 172.
66. Hunter surmises, "She probably let you think [you were White]. Hoped you'd think it."
Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 173.
69. Id.
70. MORRISON, supra note 64, at 159.
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Scales-Trent argues that passing probably hurt her great-uncle more than
anyone else, by rendering him incomplete, severed from his own memories
while keeping secrets from his old and perhaps his new family.71 Yet,
finally, her hope for her great-uncle Charles is similar to Morrison's vision
of Golden Gray-that he act as a Good Samaritan for Black people in
desperate circumstances.
7 2
By this standard, Madeleine Albright is doing all she ever could,
regardless of when she first had an inkling that she might be descended
from Jews. Albright has not been a careerist or a practitioner of an amoral
Realpolitik, 6 la Henry Kissinger, who became the first Jew to be
appointed Secretary of State. Rather, Albright has viewed the Holocaust as
central to her view of foreign policy, and human rights as an essential
foreign policy precept. She meets the Good Samaritan test. Query,
however, whether Bernard Malamud, who wrote of the disaster which
befalls Freeman when he conceals his past in The Lady of the Lake, would
think this virtual acknowledgment sufficient. Morrison's and Scales-
Trent's visions of the incompleteness which follows from a failure of
explicit acknowledgment suggest that they have the same concerns.
Parallels between Jewish American and African American literature
are also manifest in the shame which some characters feel about other
members of their figurative family. The notion of a shanda for the goyim
which triggers Judge Wapter's letter to Nathan Zuckerman in Roth's The
Ghost Writer, is chillingly present in Dr. Bledsoe from Ralph Ellison's
Invisible Man. Bledsoe runs a college much like the Tuskegee Institute,
which Booker T. Washington founded and Ellison attended. 73  Like
German Jews seeking to disavow the Ostjuden, Dr. Bledsoe regards the
poor Blacks who live near the college as embarrassments, who will
discredit Blacks-and Bledsoe in particular-before the White man.
Because of his concern for his position, Bledsoe is incensed when the
novel's narrator, a promising student at the dollege, obeys the request of a
White trustee, Mr. Norton, to see some of the less affluent sections of
town.7 4 Receiving the narrator in his office, Bledsoe asks, "Did you think
71. SCALES-TRENT, supra note 63, at 98.
72. Id.
73. Bledsoe's college features ubiquitous monuments to "the Founder," who, like the
college and Ellison's narrator, is unnamed. See RALPH ELLISON, INVISIBLE MAN (Vintage Book
ed. 1972).
74. Mr. Norton has gotten more than he bargained for, first in an encounter with the
incestuous farmer John Trueblood, whom local Whites have made a kind of poster child for
perceived Black depravity, and then in a fracas at a local bar with a troop of mentally ill Black
war veterans. Id.
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that White man had to come a thousand miles-all the way from New York
and Boston and Philadelphia just for you to show him a slum?"75 Making
his concern about his White patrons even more explicit, Bledsoe
remonstrates with the narrator for his naivet6 in believing that Whites really
seek candor and honesty from Blacks: "Why, the dumbest black bastard in
the cotton patch knows the only way to please a white man is to tell him a
lie!",76 Far from forgetting the incident, Bledsoe expels Ellison's narrator
from the college. Bledsoe gives him a letter of introduction which,
unbeknownst to the narrator, who is too honorable to peek at its contents,
he has drafted to ensure that the narrator never finds a decent job." In
Bledsoe's vision of family, honesty with outsiders is tantamount to treason
against the race.
The Bledsovian vision is not the only one. Possibilities for both
acknowledgment and engagement exist. The latter is manifest in recent
African American literature on patriarchy in the Black family. On this
issue, actual and figurative families exhibit similar dynamics. Black artists,
scholars and activists recently have become more vocal about the effect of
patriarchy in Black communities, including both violence against women
and sexual harassment in employment. These problems obviously are not
unique to the Black community; they exist, for example, in the Jewish
community as well. 78 However, the subordinated position of Black males
in the general society makes discussion of such problems analogous to the
shandafor the goyim dynamic described above in Jewish family discourse.
Engagement with patriarchy in African American literature has a long
tradition. One of the most compelling account is from Zora Neale Hurston,
in her classic novel, Their Eyes Were Watching God.79 Hurston's heroine,
Janie, travels through the book reaching for the light, like the pear tree she
admired as a girl.80  Janie's grandmother, however, thinks that such
ambitions are at best naive, and at worst, dangerous. She offers a more
sober-minded assessment, centered on what Critical Race scholars would
later call the "intersection" of race and gender:
75. Id. at 136.
76. Id. at 137.
77. Id. at 187.
78. See Horsburgh, supra note 58. Of course, patriarchy constitutes a continuum of
practices and belief-systems of which overt violence is only one part. In a more subtle way, for
example, when I view taking care of my daughters, Sarah and Emma, as "helping" my wife
Ellen, instead of simply doing what a parent does, I reinforce patriarchy, or at least perpetuate it.
See MARTHA FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER
TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES (1995).
79. ZORA NEALE HURSTON, THEIR EYES WERE WATCHING GOD (1937).
80. Id. at 24.
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Honey, de white man is de ruler of everything as fur as Ah been
able tuh find out. Maybe it's some place way off in de ocean
where de black man is in power, but we don't know nothin' but
what we see. So de white man throw down de load and tell de
nigger man tuh pick it up. He pick it up because he have to, but
he don't tote it. He hand it to his womenfolks. De nigger
woman is de mule uh de world so fur as Ah can see.81
Those who would make the figurative family a restrictive arena, like
those who believe that women's self-assertion threatens values in the close
family, have objected to Black women airing concerns about patriarchy.
As a result, writers like Alice Walker, whose book, The Color Purple,
portrays the struggle of a Black woman, Celie, to survive and prevail in the
82face of violence, have been viewed as disloyal. These writers have
persisted in their engagement with the issue of patriarchy, not out of a
sense that they can somehow divorce their identity as women from their
identity as Blacks, but out of a conviction that these two strands of identity
inevitably intertwine.
VI. AFRICAN AMERICAN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP
AND THE FIGURATIVE FAMILY
African American legal scholars have also evoked the figurative
family. For the most part, however, like some younger Jewish legal
81. Id. at 29.
82. See Linda Ammons, Mules, Madonnas, Babies, Bathwater, Racial Imagery and
Stereotypes: The African-American Woman and the Battered Woman Syndrome, 1995 WIS. L.
REV. 1003; Kimberld Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and
Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241 (1991); Angela Harris, Race and
Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581, 599-601 (1990). A comparable
dynamic manifested itself in the Black community with regard to the sexual harassment
accusations made against Clarence Thomas by Anita Hill. Discussion of other "isms" in the
Black community has also inspired debate. See Harlon Dalton, AIDS in Blackface, in THE AIDS
READER: SOCIAL, POLITICAL, AND ETHICAL ISSUES 127 (Nancy F. McKenzie ed., 1991)
(homophobia); Stephen L. Carter, Loving the Messenger, I YALE J. L. & HUMAN. 317 (1989)
(anti-Semitism); Lisa C. Ikemoto, Traces of the Master Narrative in the Story of African
American/Korean American Conflict: How We Constructed "Los Angeles," 66 S. CAL. L. REV.
1581 (1993) (anti-Asian sentiment); Reginald C. Robinson, "The Other Against Itself':
Deconstructing the Violent Discourse Between Korean and African-Americans, 67 S. CAL. L.
REV. 15 (1993) (anti-Asian sentiment). Commentators have argued that both Blacks and groups
distrusted by some members of the Black community should acknowledge their own biases and
the role of inter-group conflict in buttressing the American culture of White supremacy. See
Ikemoto, supra; Robinson, supra; cf MICHAEL ROGIN, BLACKFACE, WHITE NOISE: JEWISH
IMMIGRANTS IN THE HOLLYWOOD MELTING POT 16 (1996) (analyzing connections between
Jewish American identity and depiction of Blacks in American movies).
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scholars, this image has been portrayed in a more eclectic and less
restrictive fashion. For example, African American legal scholars have
condemned bigotry and gratuitous violence wherever they find it, including
in the Black community. Yet, African American scholars for the most part
have resisted the appeal of a bleached-out universalism.
Interestingly, however, where such universalism has appeared, it has
often sounded in the same key as some of the more restrictive shanda for
the goyim visions of family previously described. Similarly, White
scholars critiquing African American legal scholarship have not picked up
on the ties between universalism and restrictive family notions. For
mainstream White scholars, a universalist discourse, with its bows toward
tolerance and civility, could not possibly be oppressive. Indeed,
mainstream scholars have accused Black opponents of universalism of a
shanda for the goyim mentality.
A good example here is the controversy surrounding Randall
Kennedy's article, Racial Critiques of Legal Academia.84 Kennedy, in this
well-known piece, invokes Ralph Ellison as part of his critique of the
explicit racial identification of Critical Race scholars.8 5  Critical Race
scholars have argued that their experience with subordination yields
insights which are less readily available to scholars from mainstream
backgrounds.86 Rather than commit themselves to a neutral, universalist
ethos of doctrinal or empirical scholarship, Critical Race scholars
straightforwardly herald how race and other factors compromise claims to
83. See Winter, supra note 58.
84. Randall L. Kennedy, Racial Critiques of Legal Academia, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1745
(1989).
85. Id.
86. See DERRICK BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED (1987); DERRICK BELL, CONFRONTING
AUTHORITY: REFLECTIONS OF AN ARDENT PROTESTER (1994); DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE
BOTTOM OF THE WELL (1992); KIMBERLt CRENSHAW ET AL., CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE
KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT (1995); RICHARD DELGADO, THE RODRIGO
CHRONICLES (1995); MARI J. MATSUDA ET AL., WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RACE
THEORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1993); PATRICIA WILLIAMS, THE
ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS: DIARY OF A LAW PROFESSOR (1991); PATRICIA WILLIAMS,
THE ROOSTER'S EGG (1995); Alex M. Johnson, Jr., The New Voice of Color, 100 YALE L.J. 2007
(1991); Kennedy, supra note 84; Michael A. Olivas, The Chronicles, My Grandfather's Stories,
and Immigration Law: The Slave Traders Chronicle as Racial History, 34 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 425
(1990); cf GARY MINDA, POSTMODERN LEGAL MOVEMENTS: LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE AT
CENTURY'S END (1995) (situating outsider scholarship, law and economics, and other bodies of
work in context of legal academia); Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 CAL. L.
REV. 971 (1991) (discussing, inter alia, feminist scholarship); Deborah Rhode, Feminist Critical
Theories, 42 STAN. L. REV. 617 (1990) (same); William N. Eskridge, Gaylegal Narratives, 46
STAN. L. REV. 607 (1994) (discussing outsider scholarship focusing on gays and lesbians); Marc
Fajer, Can Real Men Eat Quiche Together? Storytelling, Gender-Role Stereotypes, and Legal
Protection for Lesbians and Gay Men, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 511 (1992) (same).
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neutrality. Addressing the impact of these factors makes a more particular
or "positional" perspective both valuable and necessary. Kennedy, while
acknowledging that race can make a difference in certain areas, rejects
the positionality of Critical Race scholars.
What is most interesting for our discussion of figurative family is
Kennedy's deployment of Ralph Ellison's work. Kennedy takes for his
epigraph Ellison's observation that, "[p]erhaps the most insidious and least
understood form of segregation is that of the word." 88 Ellison insisted on
depicting the craft, discipline, and diversity that pervade African American
culture, as well as the racism imposed on African Americans by Whites. In
Ellison's work, one finds repeated warnings about the dangers of
"sociologizing" the African American experience by stressing the second
theme and slighting the first. Kennedy, to buttress his argument, also notes
Ellison's acknowledged debt to White modernist writers like T.S. Eliot,
Ezra Pound, Gertrude Stein, and Ernest Hemingway.89 In short, Kennedy
portrays Ellison as an apostle of neutrality who views race or ethnicity as
incidental, much as Herbert Wechsler contended that the victims of the
Holocaust happened to be "Jewish People."
Kennedy's acknowledgment of Ellison is itself a gesture in the key of
family. His homage to Ellison reflects a link across generations of African
American, indeed American, culture. Unfortunately, his reading of Ellison
is incomplete.
Ellison's position was a good deal more complex than the ode to
neutrality described by Kennedy. Consider Ellison's views on the
relationship between art and racial identity: "[I]t is through the process of
making artistic forms ...out of one's experience that one becomes a
writer, and it is through this process, this struggle, that the writer gives
meaning to the experience of the group."90  Ellison understood the
intertwining of artistic and group identity, which Kennedy is reluctant to
acknowledge. Similarly, Kennedy regards the Critical Race Theory
critique of White civil rights scholarship as merely a skirmish in a
racialized turf war.91 He views race as largely irrelevant to the issue of
whether one's scholarship encompasses the aspirations of subordinated
groups. In contrast, Ellison forthrightly asserted that writers from other
American ethnic groups, including Jews, "do not speak adequately for me
87. Kennedy, supra note 84, at 1816.
88. Id. at 1745 (citing RALPH ELLISON, SHADOW AND ACT 24 (Vintage Books ed. 1972)).
89. Id. (citing RALPH ELLISON, SHADOW AND ACT 116 (Vintage Books ed. 1972)).
90. See ELLISON, supra note 59, at 146.
91. Kennedy, supra note 84, at 1788-1801.
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or for Negroes generally. ' 92  Yet, Ellison also acknowledged that the
experience of subordination could provide a bond between different
groups, such as Blacks and Jews. 93 While Kennedy in Racial Critiques
derogates the significance of subordination as an element in the making of
legal scholarship, Ellison is better viewed as acknowledging that
experiences of subordination are part, although not the sole part, of the
dynamic process of creation. Certainly, it would be difficult to argue that
Invisible Man is about a person who "just happens" to be Black. Rather, it
is about the rigors of reconciling identity and humanity in a world that
ascribes the former to Blacks only in stereotyped terms, and steadfastly
denies Blacks the latter.
While mainstream White scholars have labeled Critical Race
theorists' intense objections to Kennedy's piece as evidence of a figurative
family stifling internal dissent,94 Kennedy's incomplete reading of Ellison
suggests a different analysis. One can argue just as easily that Kennedy's
stance echoes the posture of Ellison's most frightening fictional creation,
Dr. Bledsoe of Invisible Man. Because Kennedy does not dispute that race
can make a difference in certain instances, 95 his argument, like Bledsoe's,
is basically a prudential one-that robust discussion of the difference race
makes will strike Whites as merely playing the "race card.",
96
Kennedy's fear is that Whites will view African Americans not as
legitimate scholars but as the academic equivalent of Bledsoe's image of
the impoverished Blacks whom Ellison's protagonist shows to the White
trustee.97 Like the impoverished Blacks whom Bledsoe despises, Kennedy
views Critical Race scholars as having "dragged the entire race into the
slime. '98  Unlike Bledsoe, Kennedy is quite straightforward in his
criticism.99 Kennedy acknowledges links between his views on issues like
92. RALPH ELLISON, GOING TO THE TERRITORY 279 (Vintage Books ed. 1995).
93. See ELLISON, supra note 59, at 117.
94. See Farber and Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School, supra note 46, at 843 n. 186; see
also BELL, supra note 86, at 110-11 (describing Kennedy's reaction to students who believed
that he "thought white").
95. Kennedy, supra note 84, at 1816.
96. Id. at 1809.
97. Other scholars have noted that the debate about merit between Kennedy and Critical
Race scholars is itself a kind of show for White people, like the humiliating free-for-all among
Black men staged by White movers and shakers as entertainment fit to follow a stripper in the
early pages of Invisible Man. See Abrams, supra note 84, at 995-98 (citing Patricia Williams,
The Obliging Shell: An Informal Essay on Formal Equal Opportunity, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2128
(1989).
98. ELLISON, supra note 60, at 138.
99. Recall that Bledsoe first harangues Ellison's hero and then offers to help him get settled
in New York. Ellison's protagonist only finds out much later that Bledsoe's letter of introduction
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Black-on-Black crime and what Regina Austin has called the "politics of
distinction," the position that a "difference exists between the 'better'
elements of [the African American community] and the stereotypical
'lowlifes' who richly merit the bad reputations the dominant society
accords them."' 0° It is only a modest leap to view Kennedy's Racial
Critiques of Legal Academia as rendering a similar tableau in the context of
academia: Kennedy and a group of like-minded Black scholars doing
relatively traditional work in the universal, neutral tradition stand apart
from the intellectual lowlifes who in Kennedy's view cheapen intellectual
discourse by making race an "intellectual credential."' 0  Under this view,
Kennedy, not his critics, is invoking a restrictive notion of figurative family
to pigeon-hole his opponents.
It would be unfair, however, to view Kennedy as a modem-day
Bledsoe. Bledsoe seemed ultimately to care far more about self-
aggrandizement than about racial uplift. Indeed, at one point in his
colloquy with Ellison's narrator, Bledsoe inserts himself into a metaphor
usually used for God, fate and the status quo.' 0 2 In contrast, Kennedy's
focus, like Ellison's, has always been on enhancing citizenship for African
Americans, and on avoiding the devaluation of Black life and achievement.
Ironically, one of the most vivid examples of Kennedy's engagement on
these issues is in his discussion of Black-on-Black crime, where he comes
closest to explicitly adopting Austin's "politics of distinction," with its
separation between deserving and undesirable elements in the African
American community.
The very act of discussing Black-on-Black crime is, for Kennedy and
other more radical outsider scholars like Regina Austin and Paul Butler, a
challenge to the notion of shame before the majority. For African
Americans, an association with crime has triggered oppressive stereotypes,
much as images of avarice and materialism have helped fuel anti-Semitism.
Bledsoe's response to Black-on-Black crime was to cover it up, to avoid
disillusioning his powerful White allies. In contrast, Kennedy confronts
the issue.
Kennedy's essential point is one that Ellison could easily have made.
For Kennedy, scholars who focus more on Black defendants than on Black
is in fact a warning to potential employers.
100. See Randall L. Kennedy, The State of Criminal Law. an Racial Discrimination: A
Comment. 107 HARV. L. REV. 1255, 1260 n.20 (1994) (citing Regina Austin, "The Black
Community." Its Lawbreakers. and the Politics of Identification, in AFTER IDENTITY 143, 145
(Dan Danielson & Karen Engle eds. 1995)).
101. See Kennedy, supra note 84, at 1801-07.
102. "'Your arms are too short to box with me, son," Bledsoe cautions. ELLISON, supra note
60, at 142.
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victims in effect are "sociologizing" Black-on-Black crime. These scholars
are pouring the diverse dynamics of crime-including desperation and
resentment, but also greed, macho posturing, and peer pressure-through
the funnel of racism. Yet, Kennedy's larger point is that the radical
scholars' focus on defendants obscures other forms of racism, including
powerful Whites' indifference to law enforcement in Black communities.
Kennedy asserts that law enforcement authorities historically have not
cared about Black victims.'03 To the extent that his argument is with the
essentializing of Black crime as a reaction to racism, and the obscuring of
other aspects of Black life, including Black victimization by crime, which
occurs as a consequence, Kennedy's argument tracks Ellison's.
The encouraging aspect of the Black-on-Black crime debate is that
even opponents of Kennedy's are engaging in a frank discussion in a
medium-the law reviews-which is read by an audience of people both in
and outside of the figurative family of African Americans. For example,
Regina Austin and Paul Butler both practice what Austin describes as a
culture of identification which acknowledges kinship with African
American lawbreakers. 104  Yet both also agree with Kennedy that many
African American lawbreakers victimize other members of the African
American community, and that the criminal justice system legitimately
undertakes to punish these offenders.1
0 5
Conversely, even Kennedy practices some politics of identification
with offenders, albeit of a skeptical sort. Describing a possible case of
race-based jury nullification in the District of Columbia, Kennedy deplores
this result, yet offers an explanation for the jury's verdict remarkably
similar to the discretionary approach outlined by Butler: "Perhaps the
nullifiers believed that this particular defendant, even if guilty, would no
longer engage in criminal conduct or that the misery created by such
103. Indeed, Kennedy has argued elsewhere, that this is the primary problem with the
current administration of the death penalty: defendants, including Blacks, who kill Blacks are far
less likely to receive the death penalty than are those who kill Whites. See Randall L. Kennedy,
McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, and the Supreme Court, 101 HARV. L. REV.
1388 (1988).
104. Ellison also acknowledges more kinship than Kennedy in this respect. See ELLISON,
supra note 92, at 300. See Austin, supra note 100; Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury
Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Justice System, 105 YALE L.J. 677 (1995).
105. Where Austin and Butler differ is on issues like the intent of those who make and
enforce the laws, and the degree of discretion to hold harmless some lawbreakers in situations
where, in an era of draconian sentencing, the punishment seems out of proportion to the crime.
Kennedy's conservatism on the intent issue, particularly with reference to disparities in
sentencing between crack and powdered cocaine defendants, is particularly odd given his focus
on the Supreme Court's disregard of statistics on death penalty disparities in McCleskey v. Kemp,
481 U.S. 279 (1987).
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conduct is less costly than the misery created by sending yet another young
black man to prison."' 106 In this sense Kennedy approaches the rueful
identification practiced by Ellison, who refuses to disown even the
incestuous John Trueblood, and acknowledges of the most hapless Black
people on the street, "[T]hat's you too, Ellison."'
10 7
As Ellison notes, however, this kinship should include race, but also
speak of a common humanity-"an identification which goes beyond
race."' 10 8 Acknowledging where you are and where you come from, on this
view, does not preempt a different acknowledgment from others, but rather
encourages it by example. In this way acknowledgment of both actual and
figurative family promotes an inclusive society.
VII. CONCLUSION
One way in which Jewish people acknowledge family ties is by
naming children after relatives who have passed away, often using initials.
My older daughter, Sarah Diane, is named after my grandfather, David
Solomon. In the world of relative ease which my wife and I inhabit with
our children, this acknowledgment was a modest way of recognizing a
different world, in which Jews had to hold figurative family at arm's
length.
This acknowledgment must inspire engagement in the pursuit of
justice. In this respect, the current moment poses challenges for Jews. As
writers like Roth have noted, the prosperity of life in America for Jews can
dull a central legacy of the Jewish diaspora: what Robert Burt, writing
about Louis Brandeis, described as a "passionate identification with the
outcast."' 109 Living in a diasporated world, according to Arendt, the outcast
has a special perspective: in a shipwreck, it is "the position on the 'top of
the mast' from which the tempestuous times ... [can] be surveyed better
than from a safe harbor." 10 Those who believe they are safe can rapidly
lose this perspective on their past. Without engagement in outsiders' quest
for equity, the Jewish acknowledgment of roots is empty.
The confluence of engagement and acknowledgment is even clearer
for the Critical Race scholars. Unlike most Jews, but like other people of
106. Kennedy, supra note 100, at 1260 n.21. Kennedy also credits Austin with influencing
his own approach. Id. at 1274 n.83.
107. ELLISON, supra note 92, at 300.
108. Id.
109. BURT, supra note 58, at 122.
110. See ARENDT, supra note 9, at 175.
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color in America, they contend with the "indignities du jour""'I I which• . . • • . , • • ,,112
reinforce racial domination. These "microaggressions range from stops
by the police, to the watchful stares of store clerks, to the assumption at
schools in predominantly White neighborhoods that women of color
arriving to pick up their own children are baby-sitters. 113 For scholars of
color, like Randall Kennedy, Regina Austin, and Paul Butler, who may
disagree about many matters, the need to match acknowledgment with
engagement is manifest. As Ralph Ellison put it, "I have to affirm my
forefathers and I must affirm my parents or be reduced in my own mind to
a White man's inadequate ... conception of human complexity .... I
must affirm those unknown people who sacrificed for me.
Ellison's assertion that one must acknowledge those one has never
had the opportunity to know applies to both Madeleine Albright and me.
While Albright never had the opportunity to get to know her grandparents,
stories of their lives can still be meaningful to her. This has been true in
my experience, as a story from my mother's side of the family suggests.
When I was a boy, my maternal grandmother, Erna, told me a great
deal about her brother, Manek, who had been killed by the Nazis. As a
boy, Manek had been a superb student at the high school or "gymnasium"
(pronounced by my grandmother in the European fashion with a hard "g").
As I wrote this article, my mother told me that Manek went on to study
antiquities in Italy, and became an engineer. Many years after Manek's
death in World War II, my grandmother accompanied our family on a trip
to Italy, although she rarely traveled and was suspicious of airplanes. We
visited the Colosseum and the other great ruins of Rome. My mother told
me that my grandmother joined us in part to retrace her brother's steps, and
make peace with her own memories. We visited the colosseum and the
111. See Patricia J. Williams, Notesfom a Small World, NEW YORKER, Apr. 29 & May 6,
1996, at 87, 92.
112. See Peggy C. Davis, Law as Microaggression, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE
CUTTING EDGE 169 (Richard Delgado ed., 1995).
113. See Williams, supra note I l, at 92. "We don't say anything-we're just accustomed
to it," Williams' classmate observes. Id Along similar lines, consider the story of Isabel
Wilkerson, a New York Times reporter returning from a trip to Europe with her husband after the
explosion off Long Island of T.W.A. Flight 800. "Increased security" in the wake of this disaster
translated into Customs officials at Chicago's O'Hare Airport singling out Wilkerson and her
husband-the only African Americans whom Wilkerson had noticed on the flight-for an
intrusive, 45-minute search. See Isabel Wilkerson, A Passenger Lands Safe, and Sorry, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 4, 1996, at E3.
114. ELLISON, supra note 92, at 287. This acknowledgment coupled with engagement is a
central gesture in Critical Race Theory. See Jerome M. Culp, Jr., Autobiography and Legal
Scholarship and Teaching: Putting the Me in the Legal Academy, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY:
THE CUTTING EDGE 409 (Richard Delgado ed. 1995).
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other great ruins of Rome. After the trip, my grandmother discovered what
she probably knew already-that memories do not rest that easily. But she
clearly felt the journey was worthwhile.
